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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to be here today to
describe the Congressional Budget Office's (CBO's) latest projections of Medicare
spending and their implications for the program in the long run.  I will also raise
several issues to be considered in designing an outpatient prescription drug benefit for
Medicare beneficiaries.  Those two topics are related:  while the financial pressure
faced by Medicare in the next decade and beyond has intensified interest in
restructuring the program, that same pressure complicates efforts to expand Medicare
to add a new benefit that could be very costly.
PROJECTIONS OF MEDICARE SPENDING UNDER CURRENT LAW
The growth of Medicare spending has been much slower in the past few years than it
has been historically.  In fiscal years 1998 through 2001, CBO estimates that benefit
payments will have grown at an average annual rate of 3.4 percent, compared with
10.0 percent per year over the previous decade.  That lower rate of growth can be
attributed to several factors, including the Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (BBA), strong
efforts to reduce fraud and abuse by increasing compliance with payment rules, and
slower inflation, both economywide and in the health care sector.
Partly in response to the slowdown in Medicare spending, the Balanced Budget
Refinement Act of 1999 (BBRA) and the Benefits Improvement and Protection Act
of 2000 (BIPA) increased payments to providers and plans above the levels that would
otherwise have resulted.  Those increases will continue to be felt in future years.
CBO estimates that Medicare will spend $237 billion on benefits for 40 million elderly
and disabled people in fiscal year 2001.  Despite the recent slowdown in spending
growth, that amount is almost 25 percent more than Medicare spent five years ago.
Medicare now accounts for about 12 percent of estimated total federal spending, or 2.3
percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
Moreover, CBO is projecting faster Medicare growth over the next decade.  We
estimate that Medicare spending will more than double—reaching $491 billion—by
fiscal year 2011, reflecting an average increase of 7.7 percent per year (see Figure 1).
At that rate, Medicare spending in 2011 will constitute 19 percent of the federal
budget, assuming no change occurs in current tax and spending policies.  In fact, the
program will account for 36 percent of the projected increase in federal spending by
the end of the decade.
CBO expects the growth in Medicare spending to accelerate for several reasons.  The
bulk of the savings from the compliance efforts that were begun in the late 1990s have
2now been realized.  In addition, provider payment rates for most services (including
hospital care and services furnished by physicians, skilled nursing facilities, and home
health agencies) are automatically increased to reflect changes in input prices.  CBO
estimates that those updates will raise Medicare spending by 3.1 percent annually over
the next decade, as a result of recent legislation boosting some rates and the expiration
of previous legislation restricting others.  Roughly 43 percent of the projected increase
in Medicare spending in fiscal years 2002 through 2011 comes from automatic updates
and other changes in payment rates.
Increases in the utilization of health services resulting from a larger and older
Medicare population make up an additional 26 percent of the projected increase in
program spending.  The number of Medicare beneficiaries will rise over the next 10
years—and the average age of Medicare beneficiaries will increase as people live
longer.  As a result, Medicare beneficiaries will use more services.  The remaining 31
percent of the projected spending increase is attributable to other factors, such as
changes in medical technology and practice patterns as well as changes required by the
BBA, BBRA, and BIPA (for example, expansions in covered benefits).
As with all CBO projections, these figures are not intended to predict the future.  As
baseline estimates, they explicitly assume no legislative changes during the period to
which they apply.  Nevertheless, they illustrate the mounting financial pressure facing
the Medicare program under current and expected future conditions.
LONG-TERM PROJECTIONS
Medicare spending occurs under two separate programs, the Hospital Insurance (HI)
program, or Part A, and the Supplementary Medical Insurance (SMI) program, or Part
B.  HI spending will total an estimated $137 billion in fiscal year 2001, paying for
inpatient hospital care, some stays in skilled nursing facilities, some home health care,
and hospice services.  SMI spending in that year is projected to reach almost $100
billion, paying for services from physicians and outpatient care facilities, as well as
medical supplies and home health benefits.  
The HI program is financed by the Medicare payroll tax and the portion of income
taxes on Social Security benefits that is earmarked for the HI trust fund.  The SMI
program is financed primarily from general revenues that cover about 75 percent of
SMI costs, with the rest covered by monthly premiums paid by enrollees.  It should be
noted that 87 percent of total Medicare revenues in 2001 come from taxes paid by
1. That change is consistent with the one that CBO applied in its most recent report (October 2000) on The Long-
Term Budget Outlook.
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current workers; current Medicare beneficiaries pay the other 13 percent through SMI
premiums and income taxes on Social Security benefits.
The annual report released earlier this week by the Medicare Board of Trustees
indicates that estimated total income to the HI trust fund will exceed estimated outlays
by $29.8 billion in fiscal year 2001.  But $12.6 billion of that amount comes from
interest on the trust fund's assets and from other miscellaneous sources.   If just the tax
revenues dedicated to the HI trust fund were counted against the fund’s outlays, its
estimated surplus this year would be only $17.2 billion.
The Medicare trustees also report that under their intermediate assumptions, the HI
trust fund will exhaust its assets in 2029—four years later than they projected in last
year's report.  But the trust fund's expenses will exceed its dedicated revenues
beginning in 2016—a full 13 years earlier.  By 2029, the revenues dedicated to the HI
trust fund would equal only 68 percent of costs; by 2075, that ratio would be only 32
percent.
Those data do not take into account Medicare’s SMI program, which is growing more
rapidly than the HI program.  As recently as fiscal year 1997, HI benefit payments
constituted 66 percent of total Medicare benefit payments.  As of 2001, that proportion
had declined to 58 percent, and CBO projects that it will have declined to 53 percent
by fiscal year 2011.  Some of that change is due to the movement of home health care
from HI to SMI according to the provisions of the BBA, which increases the estimated
balance in the HI trust fund in fiscal year 2011 by about $240 billion.  That shift
further blurs an already hazy distinction between the two programs.
The Medicare trustees' report projects that total Medicare spending will increase from
2.2 percent of GDP in 2000 to 3.9 percent in 2025 and 8.5 percent in 2075.  Those
numbers reflect a change in the trustees’ assumptions from last year, following the
recommendation of their panel of experts that they raise their projection of long-term
growth in Medicare spending per beneficiary.1
The mounting financial pressure on the Medicare program is highlighted by the large
and growing difference between projected total Medicare spending and the total
amount of federal revenues specifically dedicated to the program, including the
Medicare payroll tax, the portion of the income taxes on Social Security benefits that
4are paid to the HI trust fund, and premiums paid by enrollees for SMI.  That difference
is the minimum amount of federal general revenues required to fund total Medicare
expenditures.
According to the Medicare trustees, the discrepancy between total Medicare
expenditures and dedicated revenues will be $64.0 billion in 2001, or 0.6 percent of
GDP (see Figure 2).  By 2011, that gap is projected to rise to $138.6 billion, or 0.8
percent of GDP.  That amount would represent 30 percent of Medicare’s gross outlays,
up from 26 percent in 2001.  By 2075, that gap is projected to grow to 6.0 percent of
GDP.
Beyond the next decade, utilization of Medicare-covered services is expected to
accelerate.  As I stated earlier, Medicare enrollment, which has increased at a rate of
about 1 percent a year over the past 10 years and is expected to grow somewhat faster
over the next decade, will rise even more rapidly as the baby-boom generation begins
to retire in 2011.  According to the Medicare trustees, there will be 77 million
beneficiaries in 2030—an increase of 95 percent over this year's enrollment.  In
addition, as technology advances, more services will be available for use by more
patients, and those services will be more costly.
At the same time, the number of workers whose payroll taxes provide the bulk of
Medicare's dedicated revenues will not keep up with the growing number of
beneficiaries.  While the number of beneficiaries in 2030 will be 95 percent greater
than it is now, the number of workers paying into Medicare will be only about 15
percent greater.  As a result, the ratio of covered workers to Medicare beneficiaries is
expected to fall from 4.0 to 2.3.  Correspondingly, Medicare HI spending as a
percentage of taxable payroll is expected to rise, from 2.7 percent in 2000 to 4.9
percent in 2030 and 10.7 percent by 2075 (see Figure 3).
These financial pressures have focused policymakers' attention on restructuring the
Medicare program.  There are two basic issues.  First, Medicare lacks a mechanism for
using market forces to encourage efficiency in running the program and providing
health care to its beneficiaries.  Although the Medicare+Choice program was intended
to expand the availability of different types of private plans to Medicare beneficiaries
and increase the use of private-sector approaches for organizing and delivering health
care, price competition among such plans is limited to the premium they charge for
2. Beginning in 2003, plans can offer their enrollees rebates on a portion of the SMI premium.
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additional benefits and the amount of cost sharing faced by their enrollees.2  Moreover,
plan participation has declined, resulting in reduced enrollment, and attempts to
develop competitive-bidding demonstration projects in selected areas have not been
successful.
Second, Medicare does not provide modern insurance protection to its beneficiaries.
Its benefits are still modeled largely on those provided by the private insurance
industry of the 1960s.  And unlike typical private coverage today, it does not cover
outpatient prescription drugs.  In addition, some Medicare benefits are subject to
coverage limits, and the program has no stop-loss provision to protect beneficiaries
against the consequences of very costly episodes of illness that may exceed those
limits.  As a result, many elderly people have purchased additional coverage through
medigap policies, and others rely on employer-sponsored coverage to reduce their
financial risk.
PROVIDING COVERAGE FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
TO MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES
Beneficiaries' Current Spending on Prescription Drugs
In recent years, growth in prescription drug spending has far outpaced growth in
spending for other types of health care.  The impact of those rising expenditures on
Medicare beneficiaries, on employers who offer retiree health coverage, and on state
governments has, in turn, put proposals for a prescription drug benefit through
Medicare near the top of the policy agenda. 
Between 1990 and 2000, annual spending on prescription drugs in the United States
grew at nearly twice the rate as that for total national health expenditures, and it has
maintained a double-digit pace since the mid-1990s.  For the U.S. population as a
whole, three factors explain most of that growth:  the introduction of new and costlier
drug treatments, broader use of prescription drugs by a larger number of people, and
lower cost-sharing requirements by private health plans.  Within some therapeutic
classes, new brand-name drugs tend to be much costlier than older drug therapies,
which has also contributed to growth in spending.  Use of prescription drugs has
broadened as well, because many new drugs provide better treatment or have fewer
side effects than older alternatives and more people are aware of new drug therapies
6through the "direct to consumer" advertising campaigns of pharmaceutical
manufacturers.
Even without a Medicare drug benefit, CBO expects prescription drug costs for
Medicare enrollees to grow at a rapid pace over the next decade (see Table 1).  At an
average annual rate of 10.3 percent per beneficiary, drug costs would rise at nearly
twice the pace of combined costs for Medicare’s HI and SMI programs, and much
faster than growth in the nation’s economy.  (CBO’s estimates of rising drug spending
are based on the latest projections for prescription drug costs within the national health
accounts.)
Existing Coverage
Third-party coverage for prescription drugs has become more generous for the
population as a whole, but that trend is less clear for Medicare beneficiaries.  In 1997,
nearly one-third of the Medicare population had no prescription drug coverage.  On
average, Medicare beneficiaries paid about 45 percent of their drug expenditures out
of pocket (see Figure 4).  By comparison, all people in the United States paid an
average of 39 percent of the cost of their prescriptions.  Because Medicare
beneficiaries are elderly or disabled, they are also more likely to have chronic health
conditions and use more prescription drugs:  nearly 89 percent filled at least one
prescription in 1997.  Medicare beneficiaries made up 14 percent of the population that
year, yet they accounted for about 40 percent of the $75 billion spent on prescription
drugs in the United States.
Those factors suggest that growth in drug spending has a larger financial impact on the
Medicare population than on other population groups.  However, aggregate statistics
mask a wide variety of personal circumstances.  Nearly 70 percent of beneficiaries
obtain drug coverage as part of a plan that supplements Medicare’s benefits, but those
supplemental plans vary significantly in their generosity.  
Traditionally, retiree health plans have provided prescription drug coverage to more
seniors than any other source, and their benefits have been relatively generous.  In
1997, about one-third of Medicare beneficiaries had supplemental coverage through
a current or former employer, and most of those plans provided drug coverage (see
Table 2).  Although specific benefits vary, it is common to find relatively low
deductibles and copayments in employer-sponsored drug plans.
7However, prescription drug spending by elderly retirees has become a significant cost
to employers, and many have begun to restructure their benefits.  For example, a 1997
Hewitt Associates’ study for the Kaiser Family Foundation found that among large
employers, drug spending for people age 65 or older made up 40 percent to 60 percent
of the total cost of their retiree health plans.  Average utilization of prescription drugs
among elderly retirees was more than double that for active workers.  Although
relatively few employers in the Hewitt survey have dropped retiree coverage
altogether, most have taken steps to control costs, such as tightening eligibility
standards, requiring retirees to contribute more toward premiums, placing caps on the
amount of benefits that plans will cover, and encouraging elderly beneficiaries to
enroll in managed care plans.
In some parts of the country, Medicare+Choice (M+C) plans are another means by
which the elderly and disabled have obtained prescription drug coverage.  In 2000, for
example, 64 percent of Medicare beneficiaries had access to M+C plans that offered
some drug coverage.  However, many M+C plans have scaled back their drug benefits
in response to rising costs and slower growth in Medicare’s payment rates.  Nearly all
such plans have annual caps on drug benefits for enrollees—many at a level of only
$500 per year—and a growing share of plans charge a premium for supplemental
benefits.
While 26 percent of the Medicare population relied on individually purchased (often
medigap) plans as their sole form of supplemental coverage in 1997, less than half of
that group had policies that covered prescription drugs.  Medigap plans with drug
coverage tend to be much less generous than retiree health plans; medigap plans have
a deductible of $250, 50 percent coinsurance, and annual benefit limits of either
$1,250 or $3,000.  Premiums for plans that include drug coverage also tend to be much
higher than premiums for other medigap plans, due in part to their tendency to attract
enrollees who have higher-than-average health expenses.
Certain low-income Medicare beneficiaries may be eligible for Medicaid coverage,
which generally includes a prescription drug benefit.  All state Medicaid programs
offer prescription drug coverage (usually involving little or no cost sharing) to people
whose income and assets fall below certain thresholds.  In addition, as of January
2001, 26 states had authorized (but had not necessarily yet implemented) some type of
pharmaceutical assistance program, most of which would provide direct aid for
purchases to low-income seniors who did not meet the Medicaid requirements.  About
64 percent of the Medicare population lives in those states.
8Thus, middle- and higher-income seniors can usually obtain coverage through retiree
or M+C plans, while seniors with the lowest income generally have access to state-
based drug benefit programs.   However, beneficiaries with incomes between one and
two times the poverty level are more likely to be caught in the middle, with income or
asset levels that are too high to qualify for state programs and less access than higher-
income enrollees to drug coverage through former employers.
 Design Choices for a Medicare Drug Benefit
Rapid growth in prescription drug costs, together with erosion of private insurance
coverage for retirees, suggests that there will be continued political pressure for relief
to seniors and the disabled through the Medicare program.  Depending on the structure
of the proposed benefit, though, those same forces could also rapidly expand the cost
of a new Medicare drug program because individuals tend to consume more or costlier
prescription drugs when they obtain insurance coverage.  Further, implementing only
a drug benefit now might complicate more extensive reform of the Medicare program
in the future.  
A Medicare drug benefit might address a number of objectives.  The  most
fundamental would be to ensure that all beneficiaries had access to reasonable
coverage for outpatient prescription drug costs—but there is room for considerable
debate about what that would mean.  The various objectives that might be thought
desirable in the abstract are often mutually incompatible, so that difficult choices must
be made.   For example, it is not possible to provide a generous drug benefit to all
Medicare beneficiaries at low cost—either enrollees' premiums or the government's
subsidy costs would be high.  If most of the costs were paid by enrollees' premiums to
keep federal costs low, some Medicare beneficiaries would be unwilling or unable to
participate in the program.  If costs were limited by covering only catastrophic
expenses, few enrollees would benefit in any given year, possibly reducing support for
the program.  If, instead, costs were limited by capping the annual benefits paid to each
enrollee, the program would fail to protect participants from the impact of catastrophic
expenses.
In designing a drug benefit, policymakers must make four fundamental decisions:
 Who may participate?
 How will program costs be financed?
9 How comprehensive will coverage be?
 Who will administer the benefit and under what conditions?
Participation.  Although most Medicare enrollees use some prescription drugs, the
bulk of such spending is concentrated among a much smaller group.  In 1997, about
13 percent of enrollees had expenditures of $2,000 or more, accounting for 45 percent
of total drug spending by the Medicare population.  Forty-six percent had expenditures
of $500 or less, making up about 8 percent of total spending.  Most spending is
associated with treatment of chronic conditions—such as hypertension, cardiovascular
disease, and diabetes.  The skewed distribution of spending and the need for people
with chronic conditions to stay on drug therapies over the long term makes stand-alone
drug coverage particularly susceptible to adverse selection, where enrollment is
concentrated among those who expect to receive more in benefits than they would pay
in premiums.   
Because of the likelihood of adverse selection, a premium-financed drug benefit
offered as a voluntary option for Medicare enrollees must restrict participation in some
way.  If Medicare beneficiaries were free to enroll in or leave the program at will, only
those who expected to gain from the benefit would participate each year.  That would
drive premiums up, which would further reduce enrollment as those enrollees with
below-average drug costs dropped out.
Most of the drug benefit proposals developed in 2000 would have provided a
voluntary drug option, but they attempted to mitigate the potential for adverse selection
by one of two approaches:  either they gave enrollees only one opportunity to choose
the drug benefit, at the time they first became eligible, or they imposed an actuarially
fair premium surcharge on those who delayed enrollment.  Another approach that
would avoid the problem of adverse selection would be to couple the drug benefit with
Part B of Medicare, so that enrollees could choose either Part B plus a drug benefit or
no Part B and no drug benefit.  In that case, even if the drug portion of the benefit was
not heavily subsidized, the current 75 percent subsidy of Part B benefits would ensure
nearly universal participation in the coupled benefit. 
   
Financing.  Program costs could be entirely financed by enrollees’ premiums, or some
or all of the costs could be paid by the federal government.  Given a one-time-only
enrollment option, participation rates would be reasonably high, even if the program
was largely financed by enrollees’ premiums.  If enrollees lived long enough, virtually
all of them would benefit from drug coverage, and the erosion now occurring in the
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comprehensive coverage provided by private plans would also spur participation.
Further, employer-sponsored health plans would probably require that retirees eligible
for a new Medicare benefit participate in it, just as they now effectively require that
retirees participate in  Part B.  And state Medicaid agencies, even if not required to do
so, would choose to enroll dual eligibles (people eligible for both Medicare and
Medicaid) in a new Medicare drug benefit if their costs under the new program were
less than the cost of the drug benefits now provided under Medicaid.  However, if a
generous drug benefit was fully financed by enrollees, premiums would be high,
making the benefit difficult to afford for lower-income beneficiaries ineligible for
Medicaid.  The drug proposals developed last year all provided full subsidies to low-
income people for both cost-sharing and premium expenses, in addition to partially
subsidizing premium costs for all other enrollees.
Coverage.  A Medicare drug benefit could be designed to look like the benefit
typically provided by employer-sponsored plans.  If so, it would be integrated with the
rest of the Medicare benefit.  Further, it would have low cost-sharing requirements
(ranging from 20 percent to 25 percent coinsurance or a copayment per prescription
of $10 to $25) and stop-loss protection—a dollar limit above which no cost sharing
would be required.  Such comprehensive coverage would provide good protection for
enrollees, but it would be very costly.  Not only would it transfer most of the costs of
drugs currently used by enrollees to the Medicare program, but it would also increase
utilization among those with less generous coverage now.   
One way to constrain costs and utilization is by limiting coverage—covering only
catastrophic costs, for example, or imposing a cap on benefits paid per enrollee each
year.  If Medicare provided coverage only for catastrophic costs, most enrollees would
receive no benefit payments in any given year.  Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate
to say that those enrollees would receive no benefit, since they would be protected
against the possibility of catastrophic expenses—the main function of insurance.
Public support for a drug benefit might be stronger, though, if most enrollees could
reasonably expect to receive some benefit payments each year.  
Alternatively, policymakers could take the other approach to limiting costs:  covering
a portion of all drug costs but only up to a benefit cap.  But because that approach
would not protect those enrollees who are most in need, most of last year’s proposals
included stop-loss protection. The end result was a benefit unlike anything available
in the private sector—a hybrid that had a capped benefit, then a “hole” with no drug
coverage, and finally a stop-loss provision, beyond which the program would pay all
drug costs (see Figure 5).  The larger the range of spending encompassed by the hole,
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the less costly the program would be—but also the less coverage the benefit would
provide.    
An approach to limiting costs within the context of a more traditional benefit would
be to have a higher initial deductible amount, relatively high cost-sharing
requirements, and a high stop-loss value.  Or the program could provide a more
generous benefit similar to those provided by employer-sponsored plans, with federal
costs limited by having most of the costs financed by enrollees’ premiums.  
Administration.  The way in which a drug benefit is administered can also have a
significant effect on how costly it is.  All recent proposals have envisioned adopting
the now common private-sector approach of using pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs)
in each region.  Proposals have differed, however, in whether only one or several
PBMs would serve a region, in whether the responsible entities would assume any
insurance risk, and in what kind of restrictions would be placed on them.  
Private health plans use PBMs to process claims and to negotiate price discounts with
drug manufacturers and dispensing pharmacies.  PBMs also try to steer beneficiaries
toward lower-cost drugs, such as generic, preferred formulary, or mail-order drugs.
In addition, because of their centralized records for each enrollee's prescriptions, they
can help to prevent adverse drug interactions.  The likelihood that PBMs could
effectively constrain costs depends on their having both the authority and the incentive
to aggressively use the various cost-control mechanisms at their disposal.  In the
private sector, PBMs often have considerable leeway in the tools they can use, but they
do not assume any insurance risk for the drug benefit.  At most, they may be subject
to a bonus or a penalty added to their administrative fee, based on how well they meet
prespecified goals for their performance.  
Some of the proposals developed last year (such as the one developed by the Clinton
Administration) adopted the typical private-sector model, with a single PBM selected
periodically to serve each region and with all insurance risk borne by Medicare, not the
PBM.   Two main concerns about that model are that it might prove politically difficult
to allow the designated PBMs to use cost-control tools aggressively if enrollees have
no choice of provider in each region, and that non-risk-bearing PBMs might have too
little incentive to use strong tools, even if they were permitted.
Other proposals (such as the Breaux-Frist bills and the House-passed drug bill)
adopted a different model, more akin to the risk-based competitive model characteristic
of Medicare+Choice plans.  Those proposals envision multiple risk-bearing entities
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(such as PBM/insurer partners) that would compete to serve enrollees in each region.
Enrollees would have some choice among providers, so that beneficiaries who were
willing to accept more-restrictive rules (such as a closed formulary) in return for lower
premium costs could do so, while others could select a more expensive provider with
fewer restrictions.  If the entities bore all of the insurance risk for the drug benefit, they
would have strong incentives to use whatever cost-control tools were permitted.
However, they would also have strong incentives to try to achieve favorable selection
by avoiding enrollees most in need of coverage.  
One concern about this model was that no entities might be willing to participate if
they had to assume the full insurance risk for a stand-alone drug benefit.  To mitigate
that concern, the proposals included federally provided reinsurance for high-cost
enrollees.  (Reinsurance means that the federal government would share part or all of
the costs of high-cost enrollees.)  However, reinsurance would tend to weaken the
plans' incentives to control costs.  Another concern was that differences among plans
in benefit structures or strategies for cost control could result in some plans attracting
low-cost enrollees and others attracting sicklier and more costly enrollees.  The risk of
that kind of selection would lead plans to raise the cost of the benefit.  Moreover, to
avoid such risks, plans would, over time, come to offer very similar plan designs.
The Cost of Covering Prescription Drugs for Medicare Enrollees
CBO is in the process of updating its estimates for several of the proposals developed
in the last session of the 106th Congress.  Some sense of the potential costs of a
Medicare drug benefit can be gained, however, by adding up the amounts that
Medicare enrollees are expected to spend on prescription drugs under current law (see
Table 3).   Over the period from 2002 through 2011, CBO estimates that about $1.5
trillion will be spent on prescription drugs for Medicare enrollees under current law.
Thus, a drug benefit that covered 50 percent of enrollees' spending would cost about
$728 billion through 2011.  If, instead, the benefit covered all costs above $1,000 per
enrollee per year, costs through 2011 would be about $1.1 trillion.  If only costs above
$5,000 a year were covered, costs through 2011 would be about $365 billion.  Those
figures, however, are only meant to give a sense of the magnitude.  The costs of a drug
benefit would also depend on utilization responses by enrollees, the kinds of cost-
management tools that would be used, and how much of the gross costs of the benefit
would be financed through enrollees’ premiums.
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CONCLUSIONS
Despite the recent slowdown, spending for Medicare is expected to grow at an annual
rate of 7.7 percent over the next decade.  After that, growth is likely to be more rapid
as the leading edge of the baby-boom population becomes eligible for benefits.
Although the latest report by the Medicare trustees shows improvement in the HI trust
fund’s balances, that fund does not give a complete picture of Medicare's financial
condition—in particular, it ignores the excess of costs over premium revenues for the
SMI program.   Because Medicare’s projected spending outstrips expected growth in
dedicated revenues, the program will increasingly depend on general revenues to cover
its costs. 
While policymakers are well aware of Medicare's long-run financial problems, they
also know that its benefit package has deficiencies relative to the benefits typically
provided by private-sector insurance plans.   One such deficiency is that the program
provides only very limited coverage for outpatient prescription drugs—an increasingly
important component of modern medical care.  But adding a drug benefit would
significantly increase Medicare's costs, and unless it was fully financed by enrollees'
premiums, it would exacerbate the imbalance between the program’s projected
spending and its dedicated revenues.
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TABLE 1. CBO’S BASELINE PROJECTIONS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG
SPENDING AND MEDICARE  BENEFITS PER ENROLLEE,
CALENDAR YEARS 2002-2011
Spending per Enrollee (Dollars) Average AnnualPercentage Change,
2002-20112002 2011
Drug Spendinga 1,989 4,818 10.3
Medicare Benefitsb 6,512 10,538 5.5
Memorandum:
Gross Domestic
Product per Capita 39,275 56,569 4.1
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
a. Total spending per enrollee on outpatient prescription drugs not currently covered under Medicare, regardless of payer.
b. Medicare benefits per enrollee under the Hospital Insurance and Supplementary Medical Insurance programs.
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TABLE 2. PRESCRIPTION DRUG COVERAGE AMONG MEDICARE
ENROLLEES BY TYPE OF SUPPLEMENTAL COVERAGE, 1997
Number of Medicare Enrollees
(Thousands) Percentage of All Enrollees
No Drug
Coverage
Drug
Coverage Total
No Drug
Coverage
Drug
Coverage Total
No Supplemental
  Coverage 2,941 0 2,941 7.4 0 7.4
Any Medicaid
  Coveragea 1,448 5,449 6,897 3.6 13.7 17.4
Employer-Sponsored
  Plans 1,671 11,163 12,834 4.2 28.1 32.3
Individually Purchased
  Policies 5,753 4,532 10,286 14.5 11.4 25.9
Other Public
  Coverageb 0 1,396 1,396 0 3.5 3.5
HMOs Not Elsewhere
  Classifiedc      678   4,696   5,374   1.7  11.8   13.5
Total 12,491 27,236 39,728 31.4 68.6 100.0
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office based on data from the 1997 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.
NOTES: Some beneficiaries hold several types of coverage at once.  The categories in this table are mutually exclusive, and
CBO assigned people to groups in the order shown above.  The numbers in the table may not add up to totals
because of rounding.
HMO = health maintenance organization.
a. Comprises beneficiaries who received any Medicaid benefits during the year, including those eligible for a state’s full
package of benefits as well as others who received assistance for Medicare premiums or cost sharing through the
Qualified Medicare Beneficiary, Specified Low-Income Medicare Beneficiary, and Qualifying Individual programs.
b. Beneficiaries who received aid for their drug spending through state-sponsored pharmacy assistance programs for low-
income elderly make up 60 percent of this category.  The remainder received prescription drug benefits through the
Veterans Administration.
c. Primarily HMOs under Medicare+Choice risk contracts.
17
TABLE 3. PROJECTED SPENDING ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS
BY MEDICARE ENROLLEES (In billions of dollars)
All Spending per Enrollee Above
Year $0 $1,000 $2,000 $3,000 $4,000 $5,000
2002 81 49 29 18 11 8
2003 92 59 38 24 16 11
2004 104 70 47 32 22 15
2005 117 81 57 40 28 20
2006 131 95 68 50 36 27
2007 148 110 82 61 46 35
2008 165 126 97 74 57 44
2009 185 145 113 89 70 55
2010 205 164 131 105 84 68
2011 228 185 151 123 101 82
Total,
2002-2011 1,456 1,084 814 616 472 365
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office (using its January 2001 baseline).
NOTES: Drugs currently covered by Medicare are not included in these figures.
The numbers in the table may not add up to totals because of rounding.
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FIGURE 1.  ANNUAL AVERAGE MEDICARE SPENDING GROWTH FOR
                     VARIOUS PERIODS
SOURCE:  Historical data from the Health Care Financing Administration and Projections by the Congressional Budget
                   Office.
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FIGURE 2.  PROJECTED MEDICARE OUTLAYS AND DEDICATED REVENUES
                  AS A PERCENTAGE OF GDP, CALENDAR YEARS 2000-2075
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SOURCE: Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (2001).
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FIGURE 3.  MEDICARE HI COSTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TAXABLE
                     EARNINGS, 2000-2075
SOURCE: Board of Trustees, Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (2001).
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FIGURE 4.  DISTRIBUTION OF DRUG SPENDING FOR MEDICARE ENROLLEES, 
                  BY PAYER, 1997
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Medicare HMO: 4.4%
SOURCE:  Congressional Budget Office tabulations from the 1997 Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey.  
                 Drugs currently covered by Medicare are not included here.
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FIGURE 5.  POSSIBLE FEATURES OF A PRESCRIPTION DRUG INSURANCE BENEFIT
SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
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Medicare Expenditures and Noninterest Income as a 
Percentage of GDP, Calendar Years 2000-2075
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